CHAPTER 2
GOVERNMENT EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRUCTURE

2.1 The Government emergency response structure to handle the consequences to Hong Kong of a nuclear incident or accident at the GNPS/LNPS at Daya Bay is set out at Annex 2.1. The key is to facilitate proper coordination of government efforts at all levels, drawing on expertise from all relevant professional and frontline departments. This structure provides for comprehensive coverage of relevant bureaux and departments for each to play out its role and exercise authority in a concerted manner to support implementation of the DBCP. Notably, there will be rapid mobilisation of technical groups to assess the situation, to give advice to decision-makers based on that assessment and to recommend appropriate countermeasures.

Role of the Chief Executive’s Steering Group

2.2 In major incidents such as an off-site emergency at the GNPS/LNPS, the Chief Executive (CE) would direct Hong Kong’s response. He would be advised by a steering group comprising the Heads of bureaux and departments most involved. The composition and terms of reference of the CE’s Steering Group (CESG) are set out at Annex 2.2. The Chief Secretary for Administration (CS) may, where necessary, deputise CE in convening CESG, and also play a coordinating role among bureaux and departments in resolving issues with wider implications.

2.3 Some decisions may need to be made before CESG can convene. In those circumstances, the Secretary for Security (S for S) will be responsible for the initial implementation of the DBCP, having already received advice from key departments (i.e. Hong Kong Observatory (HKO), Electrical and Mechanical Services Department (EMSD), Department of Health (DH), Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (AFCD), WSD and Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD)) on the activation level of the plan (see Chapter 3). He would obtain further advice and support from the relevant technical and operational departments (see paragraph 2.5 below). He would ensure that CE and CS are consulted and that CESG is convened as soon as possible. Thereafter, he will continue to coordinate the Government’s response, acting under the guidance of CESG and following up its instructions.

2.4 In lesser emergencies, CESG may not need to be convened. Members of CESG will be kept informed of the overall situation by S for S, and their departments will inform them of matters within their own responsibilities.
Role of the Implementation Task Force

2.5 When CESG is not convened, the overall responsibility for the implementation of the DBCP will rest with S for S. He may convene an Implementation Task Force (ITF) with a composition covering all relevant technical and operational departments. ITF will support S for S on all aspects relating to the implementation of the DBCP covering not only technical, expert matters, but also operational and service issues. The composition and terms of reference of ITF are at Annex 2.4.

Role of the Information Policy Committee

2.6 In any emergency at the GNPS/LNPS, it is vital for the public to be kept fully in the picture, so that any panic caused by exaggerated fears and rumours can be avoided or mitigated. The Information Policy Committee (IPC) to be convened by the Director of Information Services will provide advice to CESG and S for S on public announcements concerning the most significant events (see Chapter 5).

Role of Secretary for Security

2.7 S for S occupies a key role in the activation and implementation of the DBCP. It is his responsibility to activate the DBCP at the appropriate level (see Chapter 3), and to direct and coordinate the Government’s response to the nuclear incident, either directly or under the guidance of CESG.

2.8 S for S will discharge his responsibilities with the support of ITF, and will be underpinned by Emergency Monitoring and Support Centre (EMSC). EMSC is the Government’s civil emergency monitoring and support organisation and can be activated, according to established procedures, once any emergency has been declared. When activated under the DBCP, the EMSC procedures will remain the same as for other emergencies, but its Manning will be enhanced by the provision of Liaison Officers sent by departments with key roles to play in the DBCP, as set out in this plan or as requested by EMSC. The role of Liaison Officers is set out at Annex 2.3. The Government Security Officer and his staff in Emergency Support Unit will provide guidance and support to the operation of EMSC.

2.9 It is essential that departmental representatives acting as members of ITF or as Liaison Officers in EMSC are continuously informed by their headquarters about incoming data and assessments of the situation; raw data should be limited to that specifically requested. Only in this way can appropriate advice be given to S for S.

2.10 The specific responsibilities of S for S, with ITF’s support, are –
(a) to determine, with advice from HKO, EMSD, DH, AFCD, WSD and FEHD on the appropriate activation level of the DBCP (Chapter 3);

(b) to activate EMSC and to maintain continuous communication with HKO, EMSD and DH so that immediate reports can be obtained on –

(i) the situation at the GNPS/LNPS;

(ii) the observations and advice of the international community, including IAEA, World Health Organization (WHO) and other relevant international and national organisations or authorities;

(iii) the actual and predicted radiological situation in Hong Kong; and

(iv) the recommended countermeasures to protect the people of Hong Kong from danger from both the plume and the ingestion pathways;

(c) to ensure that CE, CS and other members of CESG (Annex 2.2) are notified of the situation and, when necessary, to convene an urgent meeting;

(d) to coordinate liaison with the Mainland authorities/organisations (including the Guangdong Nuclear Power Joint Venture Company Limited (GNPJVC), DNMC, Prevention and Emergency Administrative Commission Office of Guangdong Province for Nuclear Accident of Civil Nuclear Facility (PEACO), Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council (HKMAO), China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) and National Nuclear Safety Agency) in order to obtain the fullest possible information and, where practicable, to enable coordinated and mutually supportive action to be taken with Guangdong to deal with the situation (Chapters 3 & 14);

(e) in the event of the most serious situations, to take immediate decisions in consultation with ITF (taking into consideration the reports at (b)) concerning –

(i) implementation of evacuation or sheltering on Ping Chau and within the 20 km EPZI in Mirs Bay and any other countermeasures as necessary (e.g. use of thyroid blocking agent) (Chapter 6);

(ii) implementation of boundary control measures (Chapter 7);
(iii) provision of appropriate assistance to contaminated persons through the setting up of Monitoring Centres and Emergency Radiation Treatment Centres (Chapter 8);

(iv) implementation of countermeasures against the ingestion pathway (Chapter 9); and

(v) implementation of measures to protect government emergency workers (Chapters 8 and 13);

(f) to advise CESG, once established, on the countermeasures taken or countermeasures to be taken (as in (e) above) and to ensure the implementation of CESG's decisions;

(g) to prepare, through EMSC, regular reports on the situation for CESG;

(h) to advise CESG on the practical necessity for making emergency legislation to cope with the emergency and to follow up the decision (Chapter 12);

(i) to assess and advise CESG on whether external assistance should be sought from IAEA or other parties to enhance Hong Kong's emergency response arrangements; to be the authority for liaison with IAEA through CAEA; to assess and to advise CESG whether to accede to the requests for assistance from PEACO, if any (Chapter 14);

(j) to authorise the initial press release on the incident and to ensure that relevant advice and information is promulgated to the public and the media by the Combined Information Centre (CIC) of the Information Services Department (ISD); to ensure that other government departments are aware of the overall situation concerning the incident and Hong Kong's response to it (Chapter 5);

(k) to maintain the DBCP website (through EMSC with the support of Information Technology Management Unit of the Security Bureau (SB)) for coordination and dissemination of up-to-date information during a nuclear emergency; and

(l) to ensure that the DBCP is kept updated and to remind bureaux/departments to keep their departmental contingency plans up-to-date (the responsibility for which rests with the head of the bureau/department concerned).
Annex 2.1

**DBCP Government Emergency Response Structure**

- **The Chief Executive**
  - Chief Secretary for Administration (CS)
  - Chief Executive’s Steering Group (CESG)
  - Secretary for Security (S for S)
  - Implementation Task Force (ITF)

- **Emergency co-ordination**
  - Emergency Monitoring & Supporting Centre (EMSC)
  - Security Bureau and Liaison Officers

- **Operation and Support Departments serving in EMSC (Annex 2.3)**
  - Hong Kong Observatory (HKO)
  - Electrical & Mechanical Services Department (EMSD)
  - Department of Health (DH)
  - Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF)
  - Fire Services Department (FSD)
  - Information Services Department (ISD)

- **Information Services Department (ISD)**
  - Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (AFCD)
  - Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD)
  - Water Supplies Department (WSD)
  - Auxiliary Medical Service (AMS)
  - Civil Aid Service (CAS)
  - Department of Justice (DoJ)

- **Operation and Support Departments serving in ITF (Annex 2.4)**
  - Customs & Excise Department (C&ED)
  - Transport Department (TD)
  - Home Affairs Department (HAD)
  - Hospital Authority (HA)
  - Environmental Protection Department (EPD)

- **Press Briefing Centre**

- **Combined Information Centre (ISD CIC)**

- **Information Policy Committee**

- **Director of Information Services (DIS)**
Annex 2.2

Daya Bay Contingency Plan

Chief Executive’s Steering Group (CESG)

Composition

Chief Executive (Chairman)
Chief Secretary for Administration
Secretary for Security
Secretary for the Environment
Secretary for Food and Health
Secretary for Home Affairs
Commissioner of Police
Director of the Hong Kong Observatory
Director of Health
Director of Electrical & Mechanical Services
Director of Information Services
Assistant Secretary (Security), Security Bureau (Secretary)

N.B.
Other Heads of Bureaux or Departments, including the Secretary for Justice, Director of Home Affairs, Director of Fire Services, Commissioner of Customs and Excise, Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene, Director of Water Supplies, Director of Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation, Director of Immigration and the Chief Executive of the Hospital Authority may be asked to attend as and when necessary.

Terms of Reference

To oversee, co-ordinate and direct the implementation of the Government’s response in the event of an incident at the GNPS/LNPS requiring the activation of the DBCP.
## Provision of Liaison Officers to EMSC

2.3.1 Liaison Officers (LOs) will be provided to EMSC according to the level of activation of the DBCP and the requests of EMSC Controller.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Activation of DBCP (see Chapter 3)</th>
<th>Departments to provide Liaison Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBSERVATION</td>
<td>None.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>READY</td>
<td>None. However, it is possible that some LOs required at the PARTIAL ACTIVATION level may be required to attend at the request of EMSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTIAL ACTIVATION</td>
<td>HKO, EMSD, DH, ISD and Police*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FULL ACTIVATION</td>
<td>HKO, EMSD, DH, ISD, FSD and Police*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AFCD, AMS, CAS, DoJ, EPD, FEHD and WSD may be required to send an LO at the request of EMSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAS may also be requested by EMSC to provide dispatch riders as necessary and available.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Police will send a senior police officer plus an experienced CACCS3\(^{(\text{note})}\) terminal operator.

\(^{(\text{Note})}\): CACCS3 denotes the 3\(^{rd}\) Generation Computer Assisted Command and Control System.

### Duties and Responsibilities of Liaison Officers

2.3.2 LOs form the link between their departments and EMSC and vice versa. The LO from each department should –

(a) maintain frequent and regular contact with his department to watch out for anything which should be brought to the attention of EMSC;

(b) keep abreast of developments in EMSC and watch out for anything which should be brought to the attention of his department;
(c) explain to EMSC the significance of any information sent by his department; and

(d) advise EMSC on any matters requiring actions to be taken by his department under the DBCP.

2.3.3 Departments required to provide LOs should ensure they are provided 24 hours a day until EMSC advises the requirement has ceased. LOs should be familiar with the responsibilities of their departments in the contingency plan. They should be senior enough to convey authoritatively their departments’ analysis and assessment of the situation and also, where necessary, to query such with their departments. They should possess good judgement and have the ability to prepare clear practical advice based on a technical analysis of the situation.
Annex 2.4

Daya Bay Contingency Plan

Implementation Task Force (ITF)

Composition

Secretary for Security or his representative (Chairman)
Director of Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation or his representative
Chief Staff Officer, Auxiliary Medical Service or his representative
Commissioner of Customs and Excise or his representative
Chief Staff Officer, Civil Aid Service or his representative
Director of Health or his representative
Director of Electrical and Mechanical Services or his representative
Director of Environmental Protection or his representative
Director of Fire Services or his representative
Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene or his representative
Director of Home Affairs or his representative
Director of the Hong Kong Observatory or his representative
Commissioner of Police or his representative
Chief Executive, Hospital Authority or his representative
Director of Information Services or his representative
Commissioner for Transport or his representative
Director of Water Supplies or his representative
Assistant Secretary, Security Bureau (Secretary)

Terms of Reference

To support the Secretary for Security in coordinating the implementation of the DBCP, by providing authoritative advice as and when required, facilitating sound decision making and disseminating information and instructions within the Government and to the public.

N.B.

1. Other Heads of bureaux or departments or their representatives may be co-opted into ITF at the discretion of S for S.

2. All representatives should be at sufficiently senior levels with delegation to speak authoritatively on behalf of their bureaux/departments and provide professional advice competently at ITF.
3. Bureaux/departments concerned must provide such representatives 24 hours a day during any emergency for duty in EMSC if required.

4. The representative of each department at the press conference convened by EMSC or ITF should preferably be at directorate level. In the event ITF and press conference are to be attended by different officers of the same department, issues discussed at ITF should be brought to the attention of the attending officer prior to the press conference.